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Abstract
We revisit the empirical relationship between output volatility and
government expenditure in a model where the two are jointly deter-
mined. The key regressors in our model are trade and ¯nancial integra-
tion indicators, institutional variables, including central bank indepen-
dence, and a measure of de facto exchange rate °exibility. Our ¯ndings
consistently signal that government discretion has destabilising e®ects
on growth volatility. We con¯rm that government size increases with
trade integration, but this has adverse e®ects because public spending is
positively related to growth volatility. Institutions that increase policy-
makers accountability limit the level of public expenditure and volatility.
In this regard, our results support the view that stronger institutions
increase policy e±ciency.
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O±ce, Yaoundµ e Cameroon, P.O. Box 14935, e-mail: fcarmignani@uneca.org. The views
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21 Introduction
The emerging consensus on the large costs of wide economic °uctuations1 has
propelled a lively debate on the sources of output growth volatility and the
possible smoothing role of policies and institutions. In a famous contribution
Rodrik (1998) argued that trade openness is a major cause of external risk and
that ¯scal policy should be used as an insurance tool. This argument resurrects
the old keynesian theme on the stabilising role of government intervention
(Gali, 1994).
We contribute to this literature by revisiting the empirical relationship
between output volatility and government expenditure in a large sample of
countries over the period 1970-2000. Our modeling approach rests on two
key considerations. First, output volatility and expenditure are jointly deter-
mined. Second, both variables might respond to structural factors such as
institutions and the degree of trade and ¯nancial openness of the economy.
In line with these considerations, we estimate a two-equations system where
variables describing cross-country di®erences in terms of politico-institutional
arrangements and external openness are included in the list of regressors.
The literature has identi¯ed three key determinants of government expen-
diture: institutions and government failures (i.e. constitutional arrangements,
policy-myopia and political instability), economic fundamentals (i.e. the stage
of economic development, demographic forces, country size), globalisation (i.e.
trade and ¯nancial openness).2 With regard to the sources of output volatility,
conventional wisdom emphasises the role of country exposure to shocks and
of the associated economic policy responses. These, in turn, are a®ected by
structural factors such as economic fundamentals and institutions.3 Our paper
brings together these two strands of literature.
We obtain a number of results. First, economic volatility calls for higher
government expenditure, but this in turn appears to increase output volatility.
We argue that this latter e®ect operates though the volatility of government
expenditure: higher expenditure is also more volatile, and a more volatile
expenditure raises the volatility of output if expenditure is procyclical. Our
1Following Ramey and Ramey (1995), various papers have identi¯ed a strong and per-
sistent negative e®ect of output volatility on output growth (see inter alia Fatas (2002) and
Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005). Aghion et al. (2005) show that this e®ect gets stronger the
lower the degree of ¯nancial development of the economy. Kose et al. (2006) ¯nd that trade
and ¯nancial integration signi¯cantly reduce the strength of the relationship. Chatterjee
and Shukayev (2006) however suggest that the relationship might be sensitive to changes in
the speci¯cation of growth regressions.
2Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) and Persson et al. (2006) provide comprehensive
discussions of the determinants of ¯scal policy outcomes.
3See Bejan (2004) for a survey of the empirical evidence in this ¯eld.
3evidence complements the results of Fatas and Mihov (2003).
Second, trade openness increases economic volatility and hence expendi-
ture, as argued by Rodrik (1998). However, this is not the end of the story.
In fact trade openness has a direct e®ect on expenditure over and above its
impact on volatility. Our interpretation is that this direct e®ect represents
government response to trade-induced changes in relative incomes, calling for
redistributive policies.
Third, the other main dimension of globalisation, namely ¯nancial open-
ness, generates complex e®ects. On the one hand it increases volatility, in line
with theoretical arguments on the e®ects of international risk sharing on spe-
cialisation (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003) and boom-bust cycles (Aghion et al.,
1999). On the other it has a direct disciplining e®ect on government expen-
diture: more ¯nancially open economies are associated with lower spending.
Therefore the overall impact of ¯nancial openness on government expenditure
and output volatility is ambiguous.
Fourth, we ¯nd that political institutions a®ect output volatility through
their impact on government expenditure. In fact, similarly to Persson and
Tabellini (2004), expenditure tends to be higher in parliamentary systems and
in worse polities. We will provide a common interpretative framework for these
two e®ects.
Fifth, there is an additional institutional e®ect: greater central bank inde-
pendence lowers economic volatility. This ¯nding is in contrast with the well
known neutrality result obtained by Alesina and Summers (1993), but it is
consistent with our other ¯nding that government expenditure raises growth
volatility. If government discretion has destabilising e®ects, then restricting its
ability to a®ect central bank decisions should reduce output °uctuations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief review of the literature. Section 3 introduces the econometric model.
Results from the baseline speci¯cations are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
presents some extensions. Section 6 concludes. A complete description of the
variables can be found in the Appendix.
2 Literature review
In this section we brie°y discuss the key contributions of the literature to the
issues analysed in the paper.
Public expenditure and openness. The original argument put forward by Ro-
drik (1998) links the e®ect of openness on public expenditure to the increased
risk exposure that globalisation brings about and therefore to the increased de-
mand for insurance. However, in addition to risk-insurance, other channels link
4openness to spending. For instance, openness to trade can sharpen inequali-
ties across sectors of the economy and/or between workers with di®erent skills
(Kletzer, 2002). These growing inequalities might then translate into stronger
redistributive demands and increased public spending.4 Our explicit modeling
of the joint e®ect of globalisation on volatility and ¯scal policy allows us to
shed light on this issue and improve the understanding of the transmission
channels.
Fiscal policy and output volatility. Gali (1994) documents a negative serial
correlation between government size and output volatility. This result is con-
¯rmed and apparently reinforced in Fatas and Mihov (2001), who show that
even after controlling for endogeneity, the negative correlation is still present
and, in some cases, it becomes even more signi¯cant. Andres et al. (2004) pro-
vide a rigourous theoretical underpinning for this result. In their framework,
the working of automatic stabilizers should imply a negative correlation be-
tween public spending and volatility. However, a growing amount of evidence
points to a pro-cyclical pattern of ¯scal policy (see Lane (2003), Kaminsky et
al. (2004) Alesina and Tabellini (2006)). If the discretionary component of ex-
penditure is pro-cyclical, then the sign of the correlation between expenditure
and volatility becomes ambiguous. This issue has been investigated in Fatas
and Mihov (2003) who report that the discretionary component of ¯scal pol-
icy has a strong volatility e®ect. Yet there are substantial di®erences between
our approach and theirs, as they analyse a single equation model, where the
determinants of ¯scal policy are largely unexplained.
Political institutions and public expenditure. Persson et al. (2000) formally
study how di®erent regimes (parliamentary vs. presidential) a®ect the size and
scope of government. They conclude that parliamentary regimes are associated
with higher taxes and overall spending. In parliamentary regimes accountabil-
ity towards voters is weaker and politicians are more likely to collude, this
in turn results in higher rents and higher taxation.5 Persson and Tabellini
(2003, 2004) provide evidence that government expenditure in percent of GDP
is lower in presidential regimes and in countries with a majoritarian rule. In-
stitutions might also a®ect volatility through their in°uence on government
expenditure. Acemoglu et al. (2003) explicitly test the volatility e®ect of the
quality of institutions, as measured by the extent of constitutional limits on
the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive. They conclude that poor
institutions lead to economic instability and to bad macroeconomic policies
via a variety of mediating channels. Henisz (2004), using a measure of checks
4Kim (2007) shows that much of the openness-spending nexus should be attributed to
channels other than insurance against increased volatility.
5Austen-Smith (2000) and Persson et al. (2006) obtain similar results using di®erent
theoretical approaches.
5and balances, obtains that worse institutions increase ¯scal policy volatility
by allowing policymakers to suddenly revert the existing course of policy ac-
tion. Policy volatility can therefore be the link between institutions and output
volatility. Our paper contributes to this strand of research by providing an ex-
plicit estimates of the direct and indirect (via government expenditure) impact
of institutions on volatility.
Central bank independence output volatility and public expenditure. Early
models of monetary policy delegation postulated a positive correlation between
central bank independence and output volatility (Rogo®, 1985). Alesina and
Summers (1993) produced a celebrated neutrality result, subsequently ratio-
nalised by a voluminous theoretical research. Alesina and Gatti (1995) pointed
out that delegation schemes entailed a trade-o®, in terms of output volatility,
between the distortionary responses of conservative central bankers and the
bene¯cial e®ects of monetary policy independence from political cycles. Our
results go well beyond the neutrality result indicating that the delegation of
monetary policy indeed has a stabilising e®ect.
3 Econometric modeling
3.1 Model set-up and estimation
We estimate the following two-equations model:
¾ct = A1Xct + ®2gct + "ct (1)
gct = B1Wct + ¯2¾ct + Àct (2)
where ¾ is a measure of economic volatility, g is government expenditure,
subscripts c and t respectively denote a generic country and time, X and W are
two sets of regressors (each including a constant term, time dummies and/or
regional dummies), A and B are the associated vectors of parameters, " and
À are error terms. Some of the regressors might appear on the r.h.s. of both
equations; that is, X and Ware allowed to have some elements in common.6
We consider a general structure of residuals, allowing for heteroskedastic-
ity, contemporaneous correlation of the residuals across equations and non-zero
correlation between some of the regressors and the error term in each equa-
tion. Under these assumptions, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
provides robust estimation of the parameters of the model, without requiring
6The order and rank conditions for identi¯cation of the system limit the number of
regressors that can appear in both equations.
6information of the exact distribution of the disturbances. In fact, many stan-
dard estimators (i.e. OLS, SUR, 2SLS, 3SLS) can be derived as special cases
of the GMM estimator (see Wooldridge, 2002).
In applying the GMM procedure, we use White's heteroskedasticty consis-
tent covariance matrix. For each set of estimates we run the diagnostic test of
overidentifying restrictions to check the validity of our choice of instruments
(see also Section 3.4). The dataset used for estimation is a panel covering a
large sample of countries and spanning over a 30 years spell, from 1970 to
2000. Data are averaged over a period of ¯ve-years as we are not interested in
short term e®ects. Tables 3 and 4 provide the list of countries included in the
analysis and some descriptive statistics of the variables.
3.2 Speci¯cation of the volatility equation
In line with the literature, our measure of economic volatility (econovol) is the
standard deviation of aggregate output growth over a ¯ve-year period.7 On the
r.h.s. of the volatility equation (1) there is the other endogenous variable of the
system, total government expenditure in percent of GDP (govexp). Following
Gali (1994) the expected sign on government size should be negative.
The key regressors in our analysis fall into two broad categories: open
economy and institutional factors.
Exposure to external shocks should be an important source of volatility.
Rodrik (1998) stresses the importance of trade openness. By contrast, ¯nan-
cial openness should have a stabilising e®ect by favouring risk diversi¯cation.
However, high volatility of international capital movements could be a source
of risk per se.8 We account for these e®ects by including the imports plus
exports to GDP ratio (tradeopen), and an index of international capital °ows
liberalisation (¯nopen).9 In line with the argument of Rodrik (1998), tradeopen
is weighted by the period standard deviation of terms of trade (voltot), to ob-
tain an overall measure of \external risk" (tradeopen*voltot). In addition we
consider an index based on the de facto classi¯cation of exchange rate regimes
proposed by Reinhart and Rogo® (2004). This variable (excharr) takes higher
values (from 1 to 5) the more °exible the regime is. The e®ect of excharr
on growth volatility is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, countries that
peg their currency to an external anchor loose the possibility of using mone-
tary policy for domestic stabilisation purposes. If the economy is prevalently
7Using the standard deviation of per-capita income growth does not alter the results
(available upon request).
8See for instance the discussion in Easterly et al. (2000), Buch et al. (2002), Bekaert et
al. (2006), Kose et al. (2003, 2006).
9The index is taken from Chinn and Ito (2006). See the appendix for further details.
7hit by asymmetric real shocks, this should increase volatility. On the other
hand, °exible exchange rate arrangements leave room for a discretionary con-
duct of macroeconomic policies that is often associated with more, rather than
less, volatility. The prediction on the sign of the estimated coe±cient is thus
uncertain ex-ante.
Turning to institutional factors we provide an explicit treatment of insti-
tutional variables that shape policymakers' incentives. For the case of ¯scal
policy, the e®ect of institutions is most likely observed indirectly through public
spending. This implies that after including govexp in the volatility regression,
institutions should have no residual direct e®ect. However, if institutions a®ect
other dimensions of the policy space, then the inclusion of ¯scal spending would
not exhaust the e®ect of institutions on volatility. Persson and Tabellini (2003,
2004) have become a key reference in the empirical treatment and analysis of
the economic e®ects of institutional arrangements. Following their contribu-
tions, we will focus on three dimensions of a country's institutional setting:
the quality of the polity (polity), the type of political system (system), and
the electoral rule (rule). The ¯rst is an index ranging from -10 to +10, with
higher values denoting better polities. The second is a thricotomous variable
taking value 0 for presidential and authoritarian, 1 for assembly-elected and
2 for parliamentary systems. The third is a binary dummy taking value 1 for
plurality (as opposed to proportional) electoral rule.
To complete the analysis of institutional aspects we include a measure of
de facto central bank independence. We use the turnover rate of central bank
governor (cbturn):10 higher values indicate lower independence. The expected
sign on this variable is ambiguous depending on whether central bank indepen-
dence isolates monetary policy from political instability or generates distorted
responses to shocks as in Rogo® (1985).
Finally we consider other controls already used in the empirical literature:
the level of per-capita GDP (GDP p.c.), to proxy for the stage of economic
development (Acemoglu and Zillibotti, 1997), and the ratio of domestic credit
to the private sector to GDP (¯ndepth), to account for the depth of domestic
¯nancial markets.
3.3 Speci¯cation of the expenditure equation
The dependent variable of equation (2) is government expenditure to GDP
ratio, govexp. We employ total expenditure, rather than government con-
sumption, because policymakers are likely to use transfers and subsidies as
10See Ghosh et al. (2002)
8insurance tools.11
Output volatility now appears as a regressor. If government expenditure
provides individual risk insurance and business cycle stabilisation, then output
volatility in equation (2) should display an estimated positive coe±cient.
Rodrik (1998) argues that trade exposure is a major source of risk, calling
for larger government expenditure. Note that if this e®ect works through the
increased volatility of output, then the contemporaneous inclusion of econovol
on the r.h.s of equation (2) should make the coe±cient on tradeopen not sig-
ni¯cant. Extending Rodrik's argument to ¯nancial factors, ¯nancial openness
should a®ect spending through its e®ect on growth volatility. However, gov-
ernments may consolidate their ¯scal stance to stabilise capital °ows. In other
words, ¯nancial openness could discipline governments. In this case we should
observe a direct negative e®ect of ¯nopen on government spending.
Extending the mainstream empirical literature, we include the variable ex-
charr. There are various theoretical arguments implying that exchange rate
arrangements might be an important determinant of spending. Countries peg-
ging their currency to an external anchor cannot use monetary policy for do-
mestic stabilisation purposes and therefore rely more heavily on ¯scal policy.
This argument can be reversed: policymakers might overspend under a °exible
exchange rate regime because the latter leaves room for discretionary policies.
To the contrary, the sustainability of a peg may require a tighter ¯scal stance.
In the end, di®erent e®ects of opposite sign are likely to be at work and the
role of excharr remains theoretically ambiguous.
The treatment of the politico-institutional determinants of spending fol-
lows Persson et al. (2006). Proportional systems are more likely to generate
coalition governments and political fragmentation, thus reducing the overall
accountability of decision-makers towards the electorate. This increases politi-
cians' incentive to appropriate the common pool of resources, leading to an
ine±cient policy equilibrium characterised by high spending. The dummy rule
captures the type of electoral rule, with the prediction of a negative coe±-
cient. A similar argument applies to political systems. Parliamentary systems
tend to have a larger incidence of coalition governments. The accountability of
each single coalition member falls in fragmented governments, thus leading to
overspending equilibria. The variable system is therefore expected to display a
positive coe±cient. Finally, we control for the quality of the polity through the
variable polity. We expect a negative correlation between polity and govexp, as
worse polities weaken checks and balances, reducing politicians' accountability
to voters.
11Andres et al. (2004) show the importance of di®erent components of government spend-
ing in generating a stabilising e®ect on output volatility.
9Turning to the other controls, our speci¯cation is in line with recent studies
in the ¯eld (i.e. Persson and Tabellini, 2003). The level of per-capita income,
GDP p.c., accounts for Wagner's Law. This is the hypothesis that countries at
more advanced stages of development can a®ord proportionally greater spend-
ing (because, for instance, they tend to have comparably more e±cient tax
collection systems). The log of population size (pop) controls for possible scale
e®ects. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) suggest that when the costs of partially or
completely non-rival public goods can be shared over larger populations, per-
capita expenditure on these goods is lower and hence spending ratios should
negatively correlate with population size. To account for the greater spending
of ageing societies, we also add the share of population above 65 (oldshr).
3.4 Our choice of instruments
The need to employ instruments comes from the fact that regressors other
than the endogenous dependent variables could be correlated with the error
terms in the two equations. For instance, this is likely to be the case for the
log of per-capita income. Both theoretical and empirical models of growth
emphasise the e®ects of government expenditure on the average growth rate,
and hence on per-capita income (Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995).
Similarly, there is now a voluminous literature on the interactions between
output volatility and output growth.12 Another likely candidate for endogene-
ity is the exchange rate regime, as the evidence reported by Carmignani et al.
(2006) suggests. Finally, the turnover of the central banker, being potentially
determined by the economic performance of the country, is also treated as en-
dogenous. By contrast, we follow the literature and set institutional variables
as exogenous. The remaining exogenous variables are trade and ¯nancial open-
ness, the share of population above 65, domestic credit to the private sector,
and population size.
Finding good instruments is always a paramount task. Lagged values of the
endogenous variables often prove to be only weakly exogenous (see Lundberg
and Squire, 2003). We take then a pragmatic approach to the issue. Exist-
ing empirical evidence suggests that institutional quality is a determinant of
income and exchange rate arrangements. At the same time, some of the deter-
minants of institutional quality are clearly exogenous. One of these is country's
distance from the equator (see La Porta et al., 1999), which therefore ¯gures in
our set of instruments together with time and regional dummies and the whole
of the exogenous variables. To achieve a greater number of overidentifying
restrictions, we integrate this set of instruments with three indicators of the
12See the references quoted in the introduction.
10degree of competitiveness and openness of the executive recruitment process.
These are in fact measures of institutional quality that we think unlikely to be
endogenous.13
When included in the model speci¯cation, the volatility of government ex-
penditure is also treated as endogenous and instrumented by an indicator of
government turnover from the DPI (polch), a measure of constraints on policy
changes (polconv) from Henisz (2000), and a dummy variable to pick incum-
bents with a right-wing ideological orientation (dright). This latter instrument
(coded from information in the DPI) is included because the ideological ori-
entation of the government determines the more or less active role of ¯scal
policy and hence the volatility of ¯scal instruments. Finally, polch and polconv
also serve as instruments in the speci¯cations that include the turnover of the
central bank. In these cases, the group of instruments is further extended to
include (i) three indicators of the quality of the polity that are likely to af-
fect the de facto turnover of the central banker and (ii) a non time-varying
country-¯xed e®ect representing the degree of government interference in the
economy.14 A detailed list of all instruments is reported at the bottom of the
tables 1 and 2.
We are then left with two questions. First, is our choice of instruments
good? Second, are there any other endogenous variables in the system? We
rely on a few tests to answer these two questions. We run an F-test on the
regression of endogenous variables on instruments and we always reject the
null hypothesis that the estimated coe±cients are jointly insigni¯cant. Then,
we always run the Sargan test and never reject the null that our overidentfying
restrictions are correct. Finally, we apply the Hausmann test to check for the
endogeneity of other regressors, always rejecting the endogeneity hypothesis.
While we reckon that none of these tests is the ultimate proof of instruments
validity, we take it as a good battery of diagnostics that support our choices.
4 Results: baseline speci¯cations
4.1 Base model
In order to facilitate comparison with the rest of the literature we now present
a baseline version of the model that does not include cbturn in the growth
13These indicators are the variables xconst and xrcomp in the Database of Political Insti-
tutions, and an indicator of sociopolitical risk form the CNTS (sociopolrisk).
14The three indicators of polity quality are the variables xrreg, parreg and xropen from
the Polity IV database. The country-¯xed e®ect is the variable wagepri from the Index of
Economic Freedom.
11volatility equation. Results are reported in column I of table 1.15
The ¯rst striking result concerns the simultaneous interaction between pub-
lic expenditure and growth volatility. The latter in equation (2) has a positive
e®ect on government expenditure. At ¯rst sight, this should con¯rm the view
that ¯scal policy is a shock absorber. However, in equation (1) we ¯nd that
spending increases volatility. It seems that economic volatility feedbacks on
itself through spending. As we discuss later, the transmission mechanism from
public spending to growth volatility might operate through the volatility of
government expenditure.
The e®ects of globalisation are complex. External risk increases economic
volatility and hence expenditure. This con¯rms the cornerstone of Rodrik's
argument: economies that are more open to trade face greater risk and hence
require greater insurance. In addition to that, we ¯nd a direct e®ect of trade
openness on public spending. This might be due to the unequal distribution
of costs and bene¯ts of trade integration across sectors and socio-economic
groups, that increase pressure for redistribution through public spending (see
for instance Kletzer (2002) for the US economy). We also ¯nd a clear volatility-
increasing e®ect of ¯nancial openness. Various channels could instead explain
the positive coe±cient on ¯nopen in equation (1). Financially open economies
are more vulnerable to the risk of speculative attacks and hence more likely
to experience ¯nancial crises that cause sharp output °uctuations. Moreover,
the volatility of capital °ows tends to induce boom-bust cycles (Aghion et al.,
1999). Another possible explanation is that increased risk sharing opportuni-
ties lead to more specialised productive structures, thus exposing the country
to the risk of idiosyncratic shocks (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003). In equation (2)
we ¯nd that ¯nancial openness has a negative direct e®ect on spending. Since
integration into global ¯nancial links rewards good macroeconomic policy man-
agement, ¯nancial openness seems to discipline policymakers. However, this
e®ect is to some extent o®set by the positive feedback operating through eco-
nomic volatility.
More °exible exchange rate regimes are associated with lower government
spending and with greater output growth volatility. Taking into account the
apparent procyclical behaviour of ¯scal and monetary policies, the negative
direct e®ect of excharr on govex suggests that exchange rate regime choice
and ¯scal interventism are substitutes. For instance countries pegging their
currency to an external anchor cannot use discretionary monetary policy and
therefore rely more heavily on ¯scal policy.
15Throughout the rest of this section and the next-one we always report at the bottom of
the table the value of the Sargan test statistic of overidentifying restrictions. All equations
include time dummies, not reported in the tables.
12The estimated coe±cients on the political variables in equation (2) are in
line with the theoretical expectations, with a positive sign for system and a neg-
ative sign for polity and rule (the latter not statistically signi¯cant), whereas
we cannot detect any direct e®ect of these variables in (1).16 Column II in 1
shows that removing institutional variables from (1) does not a®ect other re-
sults. The only marginal changes concern ¯ndepth in equation (1) and rule in
equation (2) that become marginally signi¯cant. Overall, the evidence depicts
an intuitively appealing picture of the role of institutions. Institutions matter
in so far as they a®ect the accountability of politicians to voters. Proportional
systems are characterised by a prevalence of fragmented ruling coalitions, gov-
ernments are typically short-lived, but changes in government do not often
lead to changes in the composition of the ruling coalition. Worse polities en-
visage weaker checks and balances of power. Both fragmentation and weaker
checks and balances reduce the accountability of decision-makers to voters.
The resulting policy equilibrium will be then characterised by overspending.
On the contrary, greater accountability to voters is likely to induce less spend-
ing. Given the adverse e®ect of public expenditure in equation (4), institutions
that discipline public spending also dampen growth volatility.
Turning to the remaining controls, with respect to equation (2) we ¯nd sup-
port for Wagner's law and for a positive e®ect of ageing on public expenditure,
whereas the coe±cient on pop is not signi¯cant. In equation (1) we cannot
¯nd a signi¯cant impact of ¯nancial depth on output volatility. In fact, di®er-
ent theoretical arguments can be put forward to explain the role of ¯nancial
depth. On the one hand, if deeper ¯nancial systems imply better smoothing
of shocks, then ¯nancial development should reduce volatility. On the other
hand, domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP tends to rise in the
advent of credit booms, which are a source of volatility. In this respect, our
chosen measure of ¯nancial depth should sharpen output growth °uctuations.
Easterly et al. (2000) suggest that e®ects of opposite sign lead to a non-linear
relationship between ¯nancial development and volatility. The estimated co-
e±cient in a linear speci¯cation would therefore result instable and generally
not signi¯cant. Further research on this relationship is certainly needed.
4.2 Re¯nements
Columns III and IV of Table 1 present two re¯nements of the volatility equa-
tion. First of all, we re-estimate our parsimonious speci¯cation of column II
by replacing the interactive term tradeopen*voltot by the non-weighted indica-
16Entering political variables one at the time, or in pairs of two, would not change the
results.
13tor of openness, tradeopen. As already noted, the use of the interactive term
allows for a better representation of external risk. However, we want to make
sure that our estimates are not sensitive to this choice. As a matter of fact,
the results reported in column III are not qualitatively di®erent from those in
column II. The only thing to notice is that ¯ndepth in equation (1) and rule
in equation (2) return to be insigni¯cant, as they were in the baseline model
of column I.17
The second re¯nement concerns the exclusion of those variables whose es-
timated coe±cients happen to be largely insigni¯cant in the previous speci¯-
cations. This is indeed a test of robustness to spurious correlations eventually
emerging from the inclusion of noise variables in the model. We therefore drop
population size and the rule dummy from the expenditure equation, and the
political variables and ¯nancial depth from the volatility equation.18 As re-
ported in column IV, results concerning the remaining variables are una®ected.
5 Extensions
We take the re¯ned baseline speci¯cation in column IV of Table 1 as the
starting point to explore some extensions and, at the same time, further check
the robustness of results. This new evidence is reported in Table 2.
5.1 Volatility of expenditure and volatility of output
The ¯nding that government expenditure increases the volatility of output
suggests that automatic stabilisers are weak and/or more than o®set by dis-
cretionary procylical spending. We further investigate this relationship by
proposing two variations of the basic model. First, in Column I of Table 2
we explore whether OECD countries behave di®erently from the rest of the
sample. As a matter of fact, previous evidence (i.e. Gali, 1994) indicates that
in OECD economies ¯scal policy works as an automatic stabiliser. We there-
fore add an interactive term de¯ned as the product of govexp times an OECD
dummy.
17We also tried to add the volatility of terms of trade to the baseline speci¯cation without
interacting it with trade openness. The large standard errors that we obtained are however
indicative of some multicollinearity problem and that is why in the rest of the paper we
prefer using the interactive term.
18In fact, ¯nancial depth is signi¯cant at the 10% level of con¯dence in the speci¯cation of
column II. However, when left in the parsimonious speci¯cation of column IV, its coe±cient
turns largely insigni¯cant. In general, its inclusion does not alter the results on the other
variable and its estimated coe±cient remains not di®erent from zero.
14The estimated coe±cient on govexp remains positive and signi¯cant. The
one on the interactive term is negative, but not statistically di®erent from zero.
This means that the e®ect of ¯scal spending on volatility in OECD countries is
not substantially di®erent from the sample average, albeit it could be slightly
less strong. In this sense, our results are more in line with Koskela and Viren
(2003).
In the second variation of the model, we further investigate the transmis-
sion mechanism linking expenditure and output volatility. Our candidate is
the volatility of government expenditure. Countries that heavily rely on discre-
tionary ¯scal instruments are likely to experience both higher spending levels
and greater spending volatility. In turn, the volatility of spending is a source
of output volatility to the extent that ¯scal policy takes a pro-cyclical stance.
To shed light on this conjecture we add the volatility of government expen-
diture (volgovexp), to the set of regressors in the output volatility equation.
The results in Column II of Table 2 are clearly indicative of a multicollinearity
problem between the level and the volatility of spending (and possibly between
government volatility and per-capita GDP). On the basis of our conjecture, this
was expected.19 To address the multicollinearity issue, we drop govexp from
the r.h.s. of the output volatility equation. This is equivalent to imposing the
restriction ®2 = 0 in equation (1). Results are displayed in Column III. In line
with our proposed conjecture, the volatility of government expenditure now
has a positive and statistically signi¯cant coe±cient. Therefore, it seems that
expenditure levels a®ect output volatility through the volatility of expenditure.
This result is complementary to the cross-country evidence of Fatas and Mihov
(2003).
5.2 Central bank independence and output volatility
An important extension of our base model concerns the role of central bank
independence in determining volatility. The de facto measure of independence
cbturn is added to the output volatility equation. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the ¯rst attempt to estimate the e®ect of de facto independence on
volatility within a structural model of two endogenous equations.20 Results
are given in Column IV of Table 2. To interpret the estimated coe±cient
recall that higher values of cbturn indicate lower central bank independence.
The positive estimated coe±cient on cbturn means that less independent
central banks cause greater output volatility. The standard view incorporated
19Note however that all other results are con¯rmed.
20Cecchetti et al. (2006) try to use a similar measure in a single equation model. They
obtain that central bank independence is never statistically signi¯cant in the output volatility
regression.
15in monetary theory (i.e. Rogo®, 1985) holds that an independent central bank
trades-o® output volatility for in°ation stabilisation, thus implying that greater
independence will increase volatility. However, some earlier empirical ¯ndings
(i.e. Alesina and Summers (1993); Cukierman (1992) and recently Cecchetti
et al. (2006)) gave way to the hypothesis that monetary arrangements are
neutral. Our result instead pushes the neutrality argument one signi¯cant
step further: central bank independence not only does not increase volatility,
it actually reduces volatility. Our intuition for this result extends the argu-
ment of Alesina and Gatti (1995). The independent central banker attaches
more importance to low in°ation than to output stabilisation. This in turn
increases output volatility due to economic shocks. However, the independent
central banker also isolates monetary policy from the distortionary e®ect of
the political cycle. In this sense, it reduces output volatility due to political
shocks. The estimated negative coe±cient on cbturn means that the second
e®ect prevails. An interesting hypothesis to be tested in the future is that the
relative strength of the political e®ect decreases at more advanced stages of
economic and institutional development. This non-linearity would also explain
why other empirical work that mainly focuses on industrial economies has not
found evidence of a positive impact of cbturn on output volatility.
The implications of this ¯nding are signi¯cant. If central bank indepen-
dence reduces volatility, then the trade-o® between in°ation and stabilisation
in the delegation of monetary policy disappears. Furthermore, by lowering
volatility, central bank independence reduces ¯scal expenditure, thus facilitat-
ing the consolidation of the ¯scal stance. In this perspective, not delegating
monetary policy to an independent central bank turns out to be a major policy
and institutional failure.21
In column V we document the existence of an interactive e®ect between
central bank independence and ¯nancial openness on volatility. Intuitively, if
the vulnerability of a country to sudden changes in capital °ows depends on
the credibility of its macroeconomic institutions, then the importance of cen-
tral bank independence in stabilising output volatility should increase with the
degree of ¯nancial openness. The joint term cbturn*¯nopen captures this inter-
action. Its estimated coe±cient is positive; at the same time the coe±cient on
cbturn remains positive and signi¯cant while the coe±cient on ¯nopen becomes
insigni¯cant. Accordingly, our interpretation is twofold. First, in line with the
above intuition, central bank independence reduces volatility and this e®ect is
reinforced the more open to international ¯nancial °ows the country is. Second,
in countries where central banks are largely independent, ¯nancial openness
21Results concerning cbturn are qualitatively unchanged if the output volatility equation
includes the volatility, rather than the level, of government expenditure.
16has a small e®ect on output volatility. On the contrary, ¯nancial openness
becomes more signi¯cantly destabilising in countries where the turnover of the
central banker is high. Finally, all of the other results are unchanged.22
5.3 Freely falling regimes
The classi¯cation proposed by Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) includes a number
of \freely falling" regimes. These are countries that are experiencing °exible
exchange rate regimes combined with high in°ation. We test the robustness of
our ¯ndings to the exclusion of these regimes. To this purpose, we re-estimate
the model with central bank turnover only on the sample of non-freely falling
regimes. The new results are reported in column VI.
It turns out that little changes. In the volatility equation, the excharr vari-
able looses some of its statistical signi¯cance, but the estimated coe±cient still
passes the zero restriction test at the 10% level of con¯dence. The coe±cient
on ¯ndepth is largely insigni¯cant, but this was indeed the case also in some
of the previous speci¯cations. All of the other results are not weakened, but if
possible statistically strengthened by the exclusion of freely falling regimes.23
6 Conclusions
Our ¯ndings on the role of public expenditures, exchange rate regime choice
and central bank independence consistently signal that government discretion
has destabilising e®ects on growth volatility. Institutions that increase policy-
makers accountability limit the adverse e®ects of ¯scal discretion on volatility.
In this regard our results support the view that strengthening institutions is a
key to improve the e±ciency of policies?
Our analysis also sheds light on the multifaceted e®ects of globalisation.
Both trade and ¯nancial openness have direct and indirect e®ects on volatil-
ity. For ¯nancial openness these e®ects are of di®erent sign. International
22We also tried to add central bank turnover directly into the spending equation. This
poses problems of multicollinearity, since the institutional variables in the spending equation
are also determinants of cbturn. As a matter of fact, all of the institutional variables become
insigni¯cant, while cbturn takes a negative sign. All of the other coe±cients are unchanged
(results are available upon request). A possible avenue of future research would explicitly
model the determinants of central bank turnover in a system of three endogenous equations,
so to avoid the multicollinearity problems.
23Column VI reports the model without interactive term cbturn*¯nopen. The results
obtained when re-estimating the model inclusive of the interactive term on the sample on
non-freely falling countries are qualitatively very similar to those in Column V and they are
available upon request.
17¯nancial integration directly increases volatility, but it also lowers spending
and (indirectly) volatility. For trade openness, these e®ects appear to go in
the same direction. Not only trade implies exposure to shocks, it also seems
to raise pressures from redistributive ¯scal policies. Once more, strengthening
institutions is the key to preserve the bene¯ts from trade integration.
We conclude with three directions of future research. First, the formalisa-
tion of the link between monetary policy and °uctuations must be revisited in
view of our ¯ndings concerning the role of central bank independence. Second,
the link between levels and volatility of government expenditure must be made
explicit, allowing for feedback e®ects from output volatility. Third, with longer
and more detailed series on ¯scal variables becoming available over time, it will
be interesting to look at individual components of expenditure in addition to
total government spending.
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22Table 1: Baseline model
I II III IV
Output volatility
Constant 0:048 0:062¤¤ 0:082¤¤¤ 0:049¤
Tradeopen*voltot 0:378¤ 0:473¤¤¤ 0:498¤¤¤
GDP p.c. ¡0:015¤¤ ¡0:021¤¤¤ ¡0:022¤¤¤ ¡0:018¤¤¤
Excharr 0:026¤¤¤ 0:034¤¤¤ 0:033¤¤¤ 0:030¤¤¤
Finopen 0:008¤¤¤ 0:010¤¤¤ 0:009¤¤¤ 0:009¤¤¤
Govexp 0:138¤¤ 0:171¤¤¤ 0:126¤¤ 0:166¤¤¤






Constant ¡0:107 ¡0:088 ¡0:045 ¡0:113
Tradeopen 0:128¤¤¤ 0:131¤¤¤ 0:107¤¤ 0:138¤¤
Finopen ¡0:026¤¤¤ ¡0:026¤¤¤ ¡0:027¤¤¤ ¡0:025¤¤¤
Econvol 1:795¤¤ 1:414¤¤ 1:512¤¤ 1:316¤
Pop 0:002 0:001 ¡0:001
Oldsh 0:958¤¤¤ 0:941¤¤¤ 0:975¤¤¤ 0:915¤¤¤
GDP p.c. 0:037¤¤¤ 0:038¤¤¤ 0:038¤¤¤ 0:041¤¤¤
Excharr ¡0:053¤¤¤ ¡0:052¤¤¤ ¡0:058¤¤¤ ¡0:047¤¤
System 0:023¤¤¤ 0:019¤¤¤ 0:019¤¤¤ 0:017¤¤¤
Rule ¡0:01 ¡0:013¤ ¡0:01
Polity ¡0:003¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤
N. obs 332 332 332 345
J-stat 0:045 0:04 0:044 0:052
Note: Estimated coe±cients on the time dummies are not reported.
*,**,*** denote statistical signi¯cant at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
Endogenous variables: dependent variables GDP p.c., excharr, voltot
Instruments: exogenous variables, xconst, latitude, sociopolrisk, xrcomp,
regional dummies, time dummies.
For variables description and list of countries included see the appendix
23Table 2: Extensions
I II III IV V VI
Output volatility
Constant 0:031 0:009 ¡0:024 0:055¤¤ ¡0:01 0:001
Tradeopen¤voltot 0:399¤¤ 0:401¤¤ 0:522¤¤ 0:303¤ 0:619¤¤¤ 0:696¤¤¤
GDP p.c. ¡0:014¤¤¤ ¡0:006 ¡0:001 ¡0:016¤¤¤ ¡0:013¤¤¤ ¡0:014¤¤¤
Excharr 0:027¤¤¤ 0:016¤¤¤ 0:013¤¤¤ 0:014¤¤¤ 0:022¤¤¤ 0:021¤¤¤
Finopen 0:008¤¤¤ 0:003¤ 0:003¤ 0:007¤¤¤ ¡0:002 0:008¤¤¤
Govexp 0:169¤¤¤ 0:045 0:178¤¤¤ 0:207¤¤¤ 0:213¤¤¤
Govexp¤dOECD ¡0:024
Volgovexp 0:409 0:589¤¤
Cbturn 0:080¤¤¤ 0:125¤¤¤ 0:112¤¤¤
Cbturn¤Finopen 0:062¤¤
Government expenditure
Constant ¡0:135¤ ¡0:164¤¤ ¡0:161 ¡0:214¤¤ ¡0:162¤ ¡0:174¤
Tradeopen 0:119¤¤ 0:130¤¤¤ 0:130¤¤ 0:075¤ 0:084¤ 0:081¤
Finopen ¡0:027¤¤¤ ¡0:024¤¤¤ ¡0:024¤¤¤ ¡0:030¤¤¤ ¡0:026¤¤¤ ¡0:026¤¤¤
Econvol 1:267¤ 1:651¤¤¤ 1:353¤ 2:202¤¤¤ 1:528¤¤ 1:645¤¤¤
Oldsh 0:865¤¤¤ 0:909¤¤¤ 0:907¤¤¤ 0:683¤¤¤ 0:676¤¤¤ 0:670¤¤¤
GDP p.c. 0:048¤¤¤ 0:045¤¤¤ 0:045¤¤¤ 0:062¤¤¤ 0:056¤¤¤ 0:058¤¤¤
Excharr ¡0:056¤¤ ¡0:045¤¤¤ ¡0:041¤¤ ¡0:073¤¤¤ ¡0:069¤¤¤ ¡0:071¤¤¤
System 0:015¤¤¤ 0:021¤¤¤ 0:022¤¤¤ 0:018¤¤¤ 0:028¤¤¤ 0:025¤¤¤
Polity ¡0:004¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤ ¡0:003¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤
N. Obs 345 322 350 340 324 308
J-stat 0:057 0:087 0:084 0:081 0:072 0:081
Note: Estimated coe±cients on the time dummies are not reported.
*,**,*** denote statistical signi¯cant at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
Endogenous variables: dependent variables GDP p.c., excharr, voltot
Instruments: Col I, same as table 1, Col II same as table 1 plus polch, polconv and dright,
Col IV to VI same as table 1 plus polch, polconv, xrreg , parreg, xropen, wagepri.
For variables description and list of countries included see the appendix
24Table 3: List of countries
Algeria Estonia Korea Romania
Argentina Finland Kyrgyz Rep. Russia
Armenia France Latvia Slovak Rep.
Australia Gambia Lesotho Slovenia
Austria Ghana Libya South Africa
Azerbaijan Greece Lithuania Spain
Belarus Guatemala Malawi Sri Lanka
Belgium Haiti Malaysia Swaziland
Bolivia Honduras Mauritius Syria
Brazil Hungary Mexico Tanzania
Chile Iceland Moldova Thailand
China Indonesia Morocco Turkey
Colombia Iran Nepal Uganda
Costa Rica Ireland Netherlands United Kingdom
Cyprus Israel New Zealand United States
Czech Rep. Italy Nigeria Uruguay
Denmark Jamaica Pakistan Venezuela
Dominican Rep Jordan Peru Zambia
Ecuador Kazakhstan Philippines Zimbabwe
Egypt Kenya Portugal
25Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. N. Obs
Cbturn 0.24 0.20 1.40 0.00 0.26 633
Tradeopen 0.39 0.32 1.35 0.06 0.23 860
Finopen -0.04 -0.47 2.66 -1.79 1.46 773
Econvol 0.04 0.03 1.09 0.00 0.05 979
Oldsh 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.01 0.04 958
Gdppc 8.06 8.07 10.53 5.55 1.12 693
Excharr 2.31 2.00 5.00 1.00 1.23 717
System 0.81 0.60 2.00 0.00 0.86 789
Polity -0.43 -3.80 10.00 -10.00 7.49 866
Voltot 0.08 0.06 0.61 0.00 0.08 938
Govexp 0.28 0.27 0.54 0.10 0.11 646
Findepth 0.34 0.26 1.18 0.04 0.26 788
Xconst 3.89 3.00 7.00 1.00 2.26 866
Sociopolrisk 0.02 -0.44 9.96 -0.72 1.14 881
Latitude 0.28 0.24 0.72 0.01 0.19 978
Xrcomp 1.66 1.00 3.00 0.00 1.07 866
Polch 0.17 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.21 947
Polconv 0.26 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.32 870
Dright 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 728
Xrreg 2.34 2.00 3.00 1.00 0.60 866
Xropen 3.28 4.00 4.00 0.00 1.40 866
Wagepri 2.78 2.71 5.00 1.20 0.74 876
Parreg 3.74 4.00 5.00 2.00 0.94 866
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Tradeopen Trade openness: exports+imports in percent of GDP, source WDI
Finopen Financial openness: First standardised principal component of R1, R2,
SHARE3 and R4; where: (i) R1 takes value 1 in the absence of multiple
exchange rates, (ii) R2 takes value 1 if current account transactions are
not restricted, and (iii) R3 takes value 1 if capital account transactions
are not restricted, (iv) R4 takes value 1 in the absence of a requirement
of surrender of export proceeds. SHARE3 is then constructed for each
year as the average of R3 in that year and in the four preceding years
(Chinn and Ito, 2001)
GDP p.c. Log of per-capita real GDP, source WDI
Econvol Volatility of aggregate GDP growth: standard deviation of the annual
growth rate of GDP over the ¯ve-year window
Govexp Total government expenditure in percent of GDP, source WDI
Volgovexp Volatility of government expenditure in percent of GDP: standard devi-
ation of the annual expenditure ot GDP ratio over a ¯ve-year window.
Oldsh Population aged 60 and above in percent of total population, source WDI
Pop Log of total population, source WDI
Findepth Financial depth: domestic credit to private sector in percent of GDP,
source WDI
Excharr Exchange rate regime: Variable taking values from 1 (extreme pegs) to
5 (freely falling), based on Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) de facto classi¯-
cation of exchange rate regimes.
Cbturn Central bank turnover rate, source Ghosh et al. (2002)
Voltot Volatility of terms of trade: standard deviation of (log) terms of trade
over the ¯ve year window, source WDI
System Type of political system: taking values 1 (presidential), 2 (assembly
elected) or 3 (parliamentary) depending on the constitutional arrange-
ments disciplining the exercise of power, source DPI.
Polity Index of quality of polity, source Polity IV.
Rule Dummy variable taking value 1 if country has a plurality (majoritarian)
electoral rule, authors' calculations
Xconst Executive constraints: measures the presence of institutionalized con-
straints on executive's decisionmaking powers, source Polity IV.
Sociopolrisk Index of socio political risk, ¯rst principal component of: assassina-
tions, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, revolutions, anti-
government demonstrations, source CNTS.




Xrcomp Competitiveness of executive recruitment: measures the extent that pre-
vailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to
become superordinates, source Polity IV.
Polch Dummy for political change, authors' calculations.
Polconv Measure of credible commitment, source Henisz.
Dright Dummy for right wing governments, source DPI.
Xrreg Regulation of chief executive: measures the extent to which a polity
has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power, source
Polity IV.
Xropen Openness of executive recruitment: measures the extent that all the po-
litically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the
position, source Polity IV.
Wagepri Wage and price controls, source Index of Economic Freedom
Parreg Regulation of participation: measures the extent that there are binding
rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed,
source Polity IV.
29